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Abstract. Database-as-a-service provides services for accessing and man-
aging customers data which provides ease of access, and the cost is less
for these services. There is a possibility that the DBaaS service provider
may not be trusted, and data may be stored on a untrusted server. The
access control mechanism can restrict users from unauthorized access,
but in cloud environment access control policies are more flexible. How-
ever, an attacker can gather sensitive information for a malicious purpose
by abusing the privileges as another user and so database security is com-
promised. The other problems associated with the DBaaS is to manage
role hierarchy and secure session management for query transaction in
the database. In this paper, a role based access control for the multi-
tenant database with role hierarchy is proposed. The query is granted
with least access privileges, and a session key is used for session man-
agement. The proposed work protects data from privilege escalation and
SQL injection. It uses the partial homomorphic encryption (Paillier En-
cryption) for the encrypting the sensitive data. If a query is to perform
any operation on sensitive data, then extra permissions are required for
accessing sensitive data. Data confidentiality and integrity are achieved
by using the role-based access control with partial homomorphic encryp-
tion.
Keywords: Cloud Computing, Access Control,Multi-tenant Database,
DBaaS, Database Security
1 Introduction
The Databases used in the cloud can be of NoSQL type (Amazon, SimpleDB,
Yahoo PNUT, CouchDB) or SQL type (Oracle and MySQL). In cloud, a ser-
vice called Database as a Service (DBaaS) is provided for database installation
and maintenance. The service provides features such as on-demand independent
service for managing the data, instant access to the ubiquitous service, etc.
The DBaaS provides the cost reduction, easy database maintenance, perfor-
mance tuning and it also supports multi-tenancy. The use of the multi-tenant
database in cloud computing leads to security challenges, due to resource sharing
[11]. The cloud users compromise the security of their data and computing appli-
cation for cheaper service because the data management for the large number of
users is not easy, and the database configurations are creating the vulnerabilities.
The DBaaS security issue is due to the absence of user authentication mech-
anism, data authorization, lack of session management and unsecured key man-
agement system. The DBaaS threats [1] are as follows:
1. Confidentiality Threats: - The information is stored on the database
server. The authorized user should get the access to the database. If data
access is through DBaaS and if encryption mechanism is weak then data will
be compromised with confidentiality. The attacks related to confidentiality
are
(a) Insider attack :- The Database administrator has all the privileges
to access the database for the maintenance purpose. If the privilege is
misused, then it leads to big confidentiality threat.
(b) Outsider Attack :- The outsider attacks in DBaaS are related to the
exploitation of the software vulnerability. The attacker can also do the
spoofing, side channeling, and man in middle attacks. Intrusion is also a
problem of the DBaaS in which the attacker access the login credentials.
(c) Access Control Issues :- Policies of access control are managed by the
DBaaS provider not by the data owner. So due to lack of the monitoring
system, the access control policies cannot be customized.
2. Integrity Threats :- The data integrity refers to protecting the data from
unauthorized modification or deletion. The data tempering in DBaaS can
happen at any level of storage.
The access control mechanism plays an important role to provide DBaaS secu-
rity such as data confidentiality and integrity [1]. It validates the rights of users
against the set of the authorization rules and states to perform the operation on
the database. The authorization states are dependent on the access control poli-
cies of the database owner or organization. The confidentiality of the database
is improved by encrypting the database and the data integrity is provided by
the access control mechanism. The user’s database access requests are properly
authorized by enforcing the access control polices.
The access control mechanisms commonly used are Mandatory Access Con-
trol (MAC), Discretionary access control (DAC) [1] and Role-based access con-
trol (RBAC). The RBAC is used for the traditional databases and it assigns
permissions according to the role of the user in the organization. The three pri-
mary rules of RBAC are role assignment, role authorization, and permission
authorization. RBAC is followed in this paper.
The use of access control provides security to DBaaS but still there are some
challenges [2] such as Integration of DBaaS access control with efficient role
hierarchy management, and session management. This paper proposes an access
control mechanism that performs the user authentication using roles, and group
authentication using group key. The proposed work also maintains secure session
for the query transactions, maintain the role hierarchy and secures data using
Paillier encryption.
2 Related Work
Zhe Jia et al. [8] proposed a privacy-preserving access control that is based
on secret sharing and ElGamal homomorphic properties. It provides security
to the data owner, but also provides protection for the data requester using the
access control policies. Their model did not considered the multi-tenant database
architecture.
Calero et al. [4] proposed a model for authorization that supports multi-
tenancy role-based access control. The path back object hierarchy is used. Hu
et al. [7] proposed a work that is based on distributed role base control for web
technology. Echeveria et al.[5] proposed a solution for the de-coupling access
control using attribute encryption.
The Siebel systems [3] used a role based access control mechanism that al-
lows multiple tenants, in which each tenant is the owner of his separate virtual
database. This mechanism supports an access control subsystem for multi user
database access, where the each user has access of at least one organizational
database attribute. They divide the database into files, files into the records,
and record into the fields. This mechanism is based on separation of individual
database files, which is based on attribute ownership or granted access control.
Yaish et al. [14,13] have proposed a multi-tenant database access control
mechanism, called Elastic Extension Table Access Control (EETAC) that allows
each tenant’s with different type of access grants to access data in multi-tenant
database. The mechanism of data retrieving in multi-tenant database is different
from single-tenant database. The data of user’s is subdivided by partitioning
between particular tenants data and by access rows and columns granted to
users, which is based on group and role assignment. The EETAC have role back
access control for multi-tenant database but does not maintain the role hierarchy
in the system.
Wu et al.[12] proposed Access Control as a Service (ACaaS) for providing
supports for the multiple access control model. They implemented role based
access control which is configured for the amazon web services. The role hierar-
chy is maintained within the access control mechanism. The drawbacks of this
method are it is designed only for amazon web services, and also it does not
support multi-level access control policies and efficient session management for
the user.
The existing works do not provide all solution at one place like secure ses-
sion management, maintenance of role hierarchy, multi-level access control and
data encryption. Some of existing [8,12] work does not support the multi-tenant
database architecture.
Fig. 1. Block Diagram of Architecture
3 Proposed work
The proposed work uses role-based access control mechanism that will perform
on the user’s query. The proposed access control mechanism provides the con-
fidentiality as well as integrity. The shared database and shared schema type
isolation are used for the multi-tenant database.
The proposed work has two main modules; i) authentication and ii) access
control. The authentication module is responsible for the user authentication
and generation of the session key. It validates user’s credentials by checking the
user name and its password. After validating, a session key is issued to the user.
This key is used for the data encryption that provides the secure communication
between user and database owner. Session key is generated using the Secure Hash
Algorithm (SHA-2). The input for SHA-2 is a pseudo-random number, which
is generated by the most efficient random number generator called Mersenne
Twister [10]. It generates integer in the range between 0 and 2k -2 for k-bit word
length. Queries are validated by the access control module and are redirected to
the database for further processing. The access control module takes encrypted
query, group key (if any group is assigned) and optional requests from users as
well as it takes user id and session key as input from authentication module. The
administrator is responsible for maintenance of the role hierarchy.
The access control mechanism contains eight essential sub-modules as shown
in fig.1. The modules are
1. Org :- It is responsible for registration, deletion and listing of users in the
DBaaS within a tenant.
2. User :- It is responsible for managing all information of the user.
3. Group :- It is responsible for managing the group in a single organization.
An organization can have many groups. Moreover, each group have its own
set of roles.
4. Role :- Role module is responsible for creating and deleting the roles. It
manages the role information in Database and also responsible for activation
and deactivation of the role.
5. Permission :- It contains all the set of rules for a role. The permission can
be modified by Admin.
6. Session :- It is responsible for maintaining the session for a complete query
transaction.
Fig. 2. Flow Diagram of Access control Module
7. Constraints :- It contains set of rules to restrict some operations.
8. Policies :- It contains a set of rules for providing access to the user’s query.
The proposed work provides data security for the tenant’s and their cus-
tomers by deploying the access control model in DBaaS. The authentication
module at the server side generates a session key which is used by the client to
encrypt the query. The access control module at the server decrypts the query
using the same session key. The data sent by the client can be sensitive as well
as non-sensitive. To ensure security, sensitive data is encrypted using a private
key generated by server. The server processes the query and the result is sent to
the client in the encrypted form. The result of the query is decrypted using the
server public key at client machine.
The user’s query needs right privileges for accessing database. For providing
the secured resource access, a role has to be allotted to the user. These roles are
binded with the permissions and constraints. If the user is part of a group, then
a group key is also provided for accessing databases.
Fig. 2 represents the data flow diagram of access control module. The Query
Handler takes user id, query, group key and optional requests as a single string
of input; it parses users input and separates various attributes from the user
input. First the role of the user is checked. The user may be allotted individual
roles, or group roles or both. Once the role is identified, the assigned role is
verified with the policies and constraints and the information is added in a set
of roles. If user belongs to any group then perform group authentication using
group key. After the successful authentication, add the group roles in the set
of roles. The set of roles is given input to activate role for the role activation,
which is responsible for the activating the roles by adding the permissions to
access the resource. If the set of roles has more than one role, then this module
search for the parent role in the given set and activate the parent role. However,
if the parent role is not present in the given set, then add permissions for the
role activation. After the role activation, get the set of columns in the query
that are accessible to the user using the activated roles. If all queried columns
are belonged to the accessible set of columns, then regenerate query according
to the policies and constraints. The regenerated query takes input as the set of
the accessible column for the user and the set of columns in the query. Then
encrypt the sensitive data in the query using a Paillier encryption algorithm.
The regenerated query is executed on the database, and the result of the query
is sent to the result handler which is responsible for checking whether the query
execution is successful. If successful, the result is sent to the user, otherwise if
any error occurs, generate an error message. In both of the cases after the query
execution, it triggers the Deactivate roles module which deactivate the user’s
role that are activated by the activate role module.
The access control module performs the user query access function which is
responsible for database query execution and encrypted query regeneration. The
three functions that are performing user query access function are:
1. Get user roles :- It adds the assigned individual or group roles in the set of
roles after the verification and validation of the roles.
2. Activate permission :- It is part of the get user role. It activates appropriate
role to provide least access for the query from the set of roles.
3. Get user column :- Get the accessible columns from the activated roles.
The tables that are used to provide database access control are as follows:
1. Tenant Table :- It stores the information about the tenants.
2. User Table :- It can be more than one for a tenant in the database.
3. Group Table :- It contains information or groups and associated user for the
tenant.
4. Role table :- It contains information about the roles.
5. Permission Table :- It is used for the permission to the user that he is capable
of performing a particular operation or not.
The access to the table depends on the access control policies and constraints
because every table has their own access policies and constraints.
3.1 User Query Access Function
The sensitive data of the query is encrypted using Paillier encryption algorithm
[6]. QAret is obtained by passing all the set of policies and constraints associ-
ated with the users, group and role that is related to the requested query. The
encryption is performed using private key for sensitive data in the query. The
sensitive columns in the database are defined by the database owner. To access
the sensitive data extra permission is required to users all the time for all roles
(except admin role). The users have the public key that is known to the user
that belongs to the role (role have permission to access sensitive data). The
decryption takes place at user machine using the public key.
The key generation steps for the Paillier encryption are as follows:
1. Select two independent large prime numbers P1 and P2 randomly such that
gcd(P1P2, (P1 − 1)(P2 − 1) = 1) (if prime numbers of equal length)
2. Compute n = P1P2 and γ = lcm(P1 − 1, P2 − 1)
3. A random integer g is generated where g ∈ Z∗n
4. Ensure n divides the order of g by checking the existence of the follow-
ingmodular multiplicative inverse µ = (T (gγmodn2))−1modn where T is
defined as T (u) = u−1
n
5. The private (encryption) key is (n,g)
6. The public (decryption) key is (γ, µ)
3.2 Get User Roles Function
This function is responsible for assigning the user’s role and activate the assigned
role for which the user belongs. If user belongs to any group role then validate
the group authentication and assign to user.
3.3 Activate Permission and Deactivate permission
The activation and deactivation functions are based on [12]. The user’s role
access permission is included in proposed work. Usually, the user is assigned
with more than one role, to provide the query access to the user so that the
least privilege is met to complete the task to the user. The Nested Set model [9]
with the use of tree data structure is used for maintaining the role hierarchy in
the access control mechanism. The main advantage of using this model is that it
requires a single entry for each role to manage the role hierarchy. The security
policies enforce the role hierarchy like a regular role that have the least privilege
and least access to the database.
If a user Uid has an immediate senior role in role hierarchy, then that role
is assigned to role Rola which needs to be activated, and an empty permission
set is returned because the immediate senior role has default permission by
policies and constraints to access database (like admin role). If the user Uid does
not have immediate senior then for each junior and siblings the permission sets
are calculated to activate the Rola. If multiple queries with the same roles are
processed then the roles overlap and the deactivation function will not affect the
other queries having the same roles.
The role deactivation algorithm is shown in Algorithm 4.and during deac-
tivation an empty set of permission is returned when any senior role to a role
Rold, which required to deactivate for the user. Otherwise, if any role is needed
to deactivate. For which the user that do not have any activated siblings roles,
and then Perall is permission set containing all permission that has associated
with activated sibling’s role for the user. Moreover, with Rold each permission
is associated, if it does not belong to Perall then it adds to returned permission
set.
3.4 Get User Columns
The get user columns function is responsible for returning the set of accessible
list of columns (Colret) which exist in different types of clauses (like select and
where) in user’s query.
4 Implementation and Analysis
A client-server architecture is considered for the implementation of proposed
work. The server is a centralized one, but the database storage nodes are dis-
tributed by default distribution of MYSQL-Cluster database. The implementa-
tion of RBAC work is at the server side. The cryptographic access control is
created using python, C++ and Crypto library.
The access control is a secure authentication mechanism that generates the
session key using SHA-2 to encrypt the query at the client system. The session
key is valid until the completion of the transaction. The server also encrypts
the result (after successful execution of the query) using the same session key.
Hence query and the result are secured during the communication. The proposed
approach performs the group validation using the group key stored at the server.
If the user belongs to the group, it has to provide the group key with the query.
The group validation reduces the privilege escalation attacks because if the user
escalate the role, and if that role belongs to any group, without group key the
access control will deny the query.
The proposed work manages the role hierarchy using the Nested set model.
The attacks related to privileges is reduced due to the role hierarchy management
with least privilege grant by adding minimum permissions for query execution.
The activation and deactivation functions play a major role to protect from the
escalation attack because by default roles are considered as deactivated roles
and both functions need a user id to activate the role. The Paillier encryption
algorithm is used to encrypt the sensitive data. So the sensitive data is secured
during the execution of the query as well as in a database. Since the Paillier
encryption has the properties of homomorphic encryption and works on the
public-key cryptosystem, it protects the sensitive data from the cryptographic
attacks such as chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) and adaptive chosen-cipher
text attacks (IND-CCA2).
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Experiments are conducted using twenty-five different roles and eight groups
are created for the tenant’s database user. For the analysis, three type of queries
are tested i) sensitive and non-sensitive data in query ii) only sensitive data in
query iii) non-sensitive data in the query. The database has the four sensitive
data columns. Fig. 3 shows number of queries vs. query access time and it is
observed that there is little difference between query access time of sensitive
data and non-sensitive data. This difference is due to extra computation time
needed for sensitive data encryption. However this overhead provides the data
confidentiality for the database owner. The role activation and deactivation time
is represented in fig. 4. The role activation function and deactivation is respon-
sible for providing integrity feature for proposed work. The role activation time
is calculated by considering a maximum of 8 roles of the users and 3 groups of
users. The queries contain sensitive attributes which need some extra permission
that is required for the role activation.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, a role-based access control for the DBaaS with data encryption
using Paillier (partial homomorphic) public-key encryption is proposed. The ap-
proach is secure from the privilege escalation because of the role hierarchy man-
agement with least privilege grants. It protects from the SQL injection attacks
since the role is to be activated to perform any query on database. The proposed
approach works for the application as a service to provide secure query access
control. The session key is used for securing the user query and on another side
the group keys are used for checking whether the user belongs to groups. The
role activation and deactivation functions help to maintain the role hierarchy.
It adds the permission in the permission set. So, to perform any query access it
adds minimum permission to execute the query and provide the least privilege
for the task. At the server end data stored is in encrypted form. The partial
homomorphic encryption used to provide confidentiality for sensitive data, en-
cryption is secured from the IND-CPA and IND-CCA2. The limitation of work
is that the user has to remember two or more keys.
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